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By the standard analysis, the minimum wage ought to create a shortage of 
jobs for young workers. The minimum sets a reward to work which draws 
the young into the labor market in numbers beyond the level of employ- 
ment which employers are willing to provide. With large numbers of 
job-hunters looking for a small number of  actual jobs, jobs become 
exceedingly hard to find, according to this view. The excessive effort 
required for young workers to find jobs in such a market is one of  the 
important social costs of the minimum wage and is starkly evident in high 
unemployment rates for the young. This analysis exhibits one important 
discrepancy from the actual experiences of American youths: in fact, jobs 
paying the minimum wage are quite easy to find. Millions of jobs are filled 
every year by a never-ending stream of youths. The young take no longer 
than  mature workers to find jobs, even though they  are clearly dif- 
ferentially influenced by the minimum wage. It is by now firmly estab- 
lished that high unemployment  among youths is associated with high 
frequency of unemployment, not long duration of unemployment. To  put 
it another way, the problem of jobs for the young is not that they are hard 
to find, but that they do not last very long. 
This chapter  presents  an  alternative analysis of  the effects of  the 
minimum wage within a labor market where both job turnover and the 
availability of  new jobs are determined through the interaction of  the 
preferences of young workers, the costs of turnover and recruiting faced 
by  employers, and  the minimum wage set  by  the government.  The 
essential hypothesis is that the arrangements observed in markets for the 
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young are an adaptation that is as efficient as it can be in the face of the 
distortion imposed by the minimum wage. This chapter argues that the 
principal effect of  the minimum wage is to increase job turnover rather 
than make it more difficult for the unemployed to find work. Through 
their recruiting and layoff policies, firms can push the market toward a 
point where the trade-off between turnover costs and job-finding benefits 
is efficient. This point involves roughly the same degree of  job-finding 
effort no matter how far the minimum wage distorts the market, at least 
up to a certain level. The markets most seriously affected by the mini- 
mum wage will have the highest rate of turnover, but the participants in 
them will not think of  them as markets where work is hard to find. 
The analysis presented here should help to square the economic analy- 
sis of the effects of the minimum wage with the facts about the operation 
of modern labor markets for the young. It does not alter in any important 
way the criticisms emerging from the standard analysis about the econo- 
mic inefficiency of the minimum wage. Excessive turnover caused by the 
minimum wage is a waste of  resources. High unemployment brought 
about by the minimum wage is just as costly if  it comes from high turnover 
as it is when the minimum creates difficulties in finding work. 
14.1  Data on Turnover and Employment 
Table 14.1 presents data from U.S. surveys comparing turnover and 
unemployment among teenagers and adults. These data strongly confirm 
that the important difference between the two groups is in their rates of 
job separation,  not  in  their rates of  job-finding. The first two lines 
measure two different aspects of  the job-finding process; teenagers and 
adults are similar in both. The first line shows the proportion of  job- 
changers who do  not experience any unemployment between jobs. If  jobs 
for teenagers were harder to find than jobs for adults, the proportion of 
job-changers without unemployment would be lower for teenagers, but, 
in fact, the proportions are slightly higher for teenagers (the survey upon 
which this finding is based is not tabulated by sex). The second line shows 
the percentage of  the unemployed who take jobs each week. Again, if 
teenage markets were slacker, this percentage would be lower than that 
for adults, but in fact it is higher, especially among women. Note that the 
evidence from the first two lines of table 14.1  does not involve the mistake 
of  trying to infer  rates of  job-finding from  data on the duration of 
unemployment. As Marston (1976) and Clark and Summers (1979) have 
pointed out, much of the explanation of the brief duration of  unemploy- 
ment among teenagers comes from their high propensity to drop out of 
the labor force while unemployed. However, the correct comparison in 
terms of actual success in finding work shows that teenagers are on a par 
with adults. 477  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
Table 14.1  Job-finding, Separation, and Unemployment Rates 
by Age and Sex, 1974 
Male  Female 
Teenage  Adult  Teenage  Adult 
Proportion of  job-changers 
Weekly job-finding rate of 
Weekly separation rate (%)"  8.3  3.3  8.9  2.8 
with no unemployment (%)"  56.0  54.2  56.0  54.2 
the unemployed  (%)b  6.0  5.7  5.3  3.9 
Actual unemployment rate (%)d  15.5  3.8  16.5  5.5 
Nm  AND  SOURCES:  "Based on data from Bancroft and Garfinkle (1963), quoted in Clark 
and Summers (1979). 
'Estimated by Clark and Summers (1979) from CPS gross flows data. This is the observed 
monthly transition rate from unemployment to employment, divided by 3.3. 
'Estimated by Clark and Summers (1979) by multiplying the observed transition rate from 
employment to nonemployment by the fraction of job changes made without intervening 
nonemployment (line [l]). 
dSource: Employment and  Training Report of  the President. 
The third line of table 14.1 presents data on the weekly rate of depar- 
ture from jobs among the four age-sex groups. Between 8 and 9% of 
teenagers lose or quit their jobs each week, compared to about 3% of 
adults. Teenage jobs are brief-they  last about twelve weeks on the 
average.  The dramatic difference in separation rates stands in  sharp 
contrast to the virtual equality of job-finding rates. The well-known  large 
gap in unemployment rates, shown in the fourth line of  table 14.1, is due 
largely to the difference in job separation rates. Table 14.1 does not 
attempt a full description of  the dynamic process by which workers move 
in and out of the  labor force, which would be necessary to give a complete 
account  of  the  differences in  unemployment  between  teenagers and 
adults. For such an account, see Marston (1976) and Clark and Summers 
(1979). 
Investigation of  possible causes of high separation rates among young 
workers is the main purpose of  this chapter. Obviously, there are impor- 
tant normal influences toward brief jobs, including the fact that a fraction 
of  employment  takes the form  of  summer jobs.  But the impression 
remains that much turnover is pathological. Consequently, this chapter 
spends a good deal of effort investigating the possible role of  the mini- 
mum wage in stimulating excessive job turnover. 
14.2  Determination of Turnover, Job-finding Rates, 
and Unemployment in the Presence of a Minimum Wage 
The analysis presented in this section is closely related to an earlier 
paper of mine (Hall 1979), modified suitably to take the minimum wage 478  Robert E. Hall 
into account. The discussion here  is intended  to stand on  its  own, 
however. 
The first component of  the model describes the mechanical operation 
of  the recruiting and job-finding process. The unemployed are viewed 
simply as a group of  people who have not yet found work, but are 
confident of  finding work eventually. Each of  the unemployed has the 
same chance of  locating a job each week. All unemployment is “fric- 
tional”; nobody is permanently unemployable. The state of  tightness or 
slackness of the market is described by a single variable, the job-finding 
rate, which I will call f.  It is the weekly probability that an unemployed 
worker will find a job. Tighter markets have higher values off and are 
preferred by workers. On the other hand, slacker markets with lower 
values off are preferred by  employers for the following reason: em- 
ployers compete with each other for workers who are available. When an 
employer extends a job offer in a tighter market, it is less likely to be 
accepted because the worker may also receive an offer from another 
employer at the same time. In formal terms, this consideration is em- 
bodied in a recruiting cost function, pcf),  which gives the number of 
offers that need to be made, on the average, to hire one new worker. Asf 
approaches one,  pcf)  approaches infinity-guaranteed  instantaneous 
job-finding would make recruiting prohibitively expensive. In very slack 
markets withfnear zero, pcf) will be only slightly more than one. In my 
earlier paper, I derived an exact form, pcf) = -  log(1 +f)/f, for the 
recruiting cost function, based on some further simple assumptions. 
The  job-finding rate is one of two major dimensions of conditions in the 
labor market; it does not by itself determine the unemployment rate. A 
very slack market, in which it is nearly impossible to find work, could 
have a low unemployment rate because few workers came to it to search. 
Similarly, a tight market could have a high unemployment rate because 
there was a large continuing flow of  newly unemployed workers into it. 
The latter is a good description of markets for youths in the modern U.S. 
economy. Thus the other dimension of  labor market conditions is the 
separation rate-the  weekly probability that an employed worker will 
become unemployed. In stochastic equilibrium, where the flow of work- 
ers into the pool of unemployment through job separations balances the 




s  +f/(l  -f) 
The job-finding rate, f,  the separation rate, s, and the unemployment 
rate, u,  are linked by this relation. Given the values of any two of these 
measures, the third is fully determined by  it. In this chapter, the job- 
finding and separation rates are considered explicitly and the correspond- 479  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
ing unemployment rate is then derived. Of  course, it is also true that 
unemployment is the difference between the supply of  labor and the 
demand for it. Further discussion of determination of unemployment will 
continue after the principles of  the efficient combination of  separation 
and job-finding rates are presented. 
It has already been established that both parties to the employment 
contract are concerned about the job-finding rate. Workers favor high 
rates and employers low rates. It is equally true that both parties are 
concerned about the separation rate. The rate is the reciprocal of  the 
duration of employment: high separation rates mean jobs are brief. Both 
very long and very short jobs are generally undesirable from the em- 
ployer’s point of view. If  an employer promises virtually permanent jobs 
to workers, it will be difficult to adjust total employment downward in the 
event of an adverse shift in demand. Permanent commitments also limit 
the employer’s power to retain ony the most productive of a group of new 
recruits. For these reasons, it is costly for employers to promise lengthy 
employment. On the other hand, very high turnover implies excessive 
recruiting and training costs. This second consideration has dominated 
most discussions of  the economics of  turnover. In markets for young 
workers, though, rather high turnover rates may actually be efficient, 
expecially in lines of work where training costs can be made low. In these 
markets employers profit from the flexibility they enjoy in adjusting 
employment to each minor fluctuation in demand. The occasional redun- 
dancy of  labor that is typical under more or less permanent employment 
arrangements is unnecessary where separation rates are high. 
The hypothesis pursued here is that employment terms adjust to medi- 
ate the conflicting attitudes of employers and workers about job-finding 
and separation rates. Specifically, the two parties should equalize their 
trade-offs between the two aspects of  the arrangement. The minimum 
wage does not impose any limitations on these dimensions of the employ- 
ment package. In a market unaffected by the minimum wage, the parties 
ought to equalize their trade-offs between cash wages and the separation 
or  job-finding rates. The fully efficient outcome is described in my earlier 
paper. The influence of an effective minimum wage in the present analy- 
sis is to prevent employers from offering better duration terms to workers 
in exchange for lower cash wages. 
In analytical terms, the efficient combination of separation rates and 
job-finding rates occurs at the point of tangency of an indifference curve 
and an isocost curve. The indifference curve describes the alternative 
combinations of  separation and job-finding rates that achieve the same 
level of  satisfaction, on the average, for workers. Presumably, it slopes 
upward, since workers will need to be rewarded with higher job-finding 
rates in order to induce them to accept higher turnover. The isocost curve 
embodies the considerations about the costs and benefits to employers 480  Robert E. Hall 
mentioned earlier. Its slope is positive for low separation rates, where the 
added flexibility of  higher turnover is a benefit, and then turns negative 
for high separation rates, where recruiting and training costs begin to 
dominate. All this can be summarized in figure 14.1. 
The outcome of  this  analysis is  an  expansion path  of  alternative 
efficient combinations of  separation rates and job-finding rates; call it 
f=  e(s).  Different points on the path correspond to different levels of 
satisfaction achieved by workers and costs incurred by employers. If  the 
market is operating at separation and job-finding  rates that are not on this 
path, employers’ costs can be reduced and workers’ level of  satisfaction 
improved by a suitable movement to a point on the path. Along the path, 
cost can be reduced only by  making workers worse off  by raising the 
separation rate. 
The forces of  supply and demand determine which of  the efficient 
combinations of separation and job-finding rates will prevail in the mar- 
ket, and thus determine the unemployment rate. Since costs are sensitive 
to the separation and job-finding rates through recruiting and training 
costs, the total demand for labor in a market will be a function LD(w,  s, fl 
of  the hourly wage w,  and the separation and job-finding rates s andf. 
Higher wages and higher job-finding rates depress the demand for labor, 
while higher separation rates stimulate it, at least over the range of 
job-fL. 
rate 
inriino  better  worse 
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variation that is considered here. Further implications of  and justifica- 
tions for the latter proposition are presented in the subsequent section of 
the paper. 
The supply side of  the market is a little more complex because the 
presence of  unemployment even in equilibrium means that there are two 
different concepts of supply. The first, gross supply, corresponds to labor 
force participation-it  consists of all the workers attracted to the market, 
including those looking for work who have not yet found it. Gross supply 
is  a function Ls(w, s, f)  of  the terms of  employment offered by  the 
market.  The other concept  is  net  supply, which  does not  count  the 
unemployed. If  u is the unemployment rate implied by the separation and 
job-finding rates, net supply is (1 -  u)Ls(w,  s,n.  Recall that u is a simple 
function of  s and f,  so that another way to express net supply is 
Equilibrium occurs in the market when demand and net supply are in 
balance: 
The equilibrium that concerns this chapter is the constrained one that 
occurs when the government sets the wage through an effective minimum 
wage at level  W.  The wage itself cannot participate in the process of 
clearing the market, but variations in the separation and job-finding rates 
can bring about a constrained equilibrium in the market. I will assume 
that they move in tandem, so as to preserve the efficient combination of 
the two rates; that is, the job-finding rate is O(s)  and not a free variable. 
This condenses the market-clearing process to a single dimension, the 
separation rate: 
This can  be portrayed  in  the somewhat unconventional  supply-and- 
demand diagram in figure 14.2. 
The demand curve is shown as nearly vertical on the assumption that 
the benefits to the employer of higher turnover and the associated change 
in recruiting costs are not very large. On the other hand, gross labor 
supply may be reasonably sensitive to the separation rate-given  the 
fixed wage rate, young workers will choose activities other than work in 
preference to the high unemployment rates that accompany high turn- 
over rates. This is even more pronounced when supply is measured net of 
unemployment. Higher separation rates mean fewer workers are avail- 482  Robert E. Hall 
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able for work at any one time, both because the work is less attractive and 
because more of  their time is spent finding new work. 
When the wage is held fixed by minimum wage legislation, the separa- 
tion rate assumes the role of clearing the market. Equality of supply and 
demand is achieved subject to  the constraint of the minimum wage; in this 
sense, the market is in equilibrium. It is important to note, however, that 
this equilibrium is not efficient. Because the minimum wage does not try 
to peg either the separation rate or the job-finding rate, private economic 
arrangements yield an efficient trade-off between the two. However, the 
minimum wage does interfere with the trade-off between the separation 
rate and the cash wage rate. Separation rates (and therefore unemploy- 
ment rates) are excessive under the minimum wage because employers 
are prohibited from offering a set of employment terms with lower wages 
and longer jobs, even though those terms would make workers better off 
and reduce employers’ costs at the same time. 
In a labor market unaffected by the minimum wage, the separation and 
job-finding rates are largely unaffected by  shifts in supply or demand. 
Unemployment  remains at a fixed “natural”  rate when, say, demand 
increases. The wage rises to clear the market. This analysis of a free labor 
market is amplified in my earlier paper. In the presence of  a minimum 
wage, the impact of an increase in demand is rather different. Because 483  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
the wage cannot respond, the separation rate falls as demand rises, as 
shown in figure 14.3. The increase in employment, from E to E', is 
somewhat less than the amount of  the rightward shift of  the demand 
curve (just as it would be if the wage were permitted to rise). Unemploy- 
ment, which is held above the natural rate by the minimum wage, falls 
toward the natural rate. 
The same apparatus will help to explain the effect of an increase in the 
minimum wage itself. For a given separation rate, a higher minimum 
wage means lower labor demand and higher net supply, so the demand 
schedule shifts to the left and the net supply schedule to the right (figure 
14.4).  The combination brings about a decrease in employment from E to 
E' and an increase in the separation rate from s to s'. Unemployment 
rises as well, as the figure 14.5 shows. 
In the traditional analysis of the minimum wage, employment falls by 
the full amount of the downward shift in labor demand brought about by 
a higher minimum. Demand  alone determines employment. The gap 
between supply and demand appears as unemployment. In the analysis 
presented here, the equilibrating role of the separation rate dampens the 
adverse effect of the minimum wage on employment. The rise in separa- 
tions makes the labor market more attractive to employers and so helps 
to offset the disincentive of higher cash wages. A stricter minimum wage 
separation 
I rate  D  D' 
labor 
E  E'  E+U  E'+U' 
Fig. 14.3 484  Robert E. Hall 
labor 
Fig.  14.4 
must raise unemployment, however. Most, or  perhaps all, of the increase 
comes from higher turnover rather than from lower job-finding rates and 
longer duration of unemployment. 
This conclusion is rather different from one reached by Finis Welch 
(1976). In a brief discussion of  the theory of  the effect of the minimum 
wage on unemployment, he concludes that it is ambiguous because the 
shortage of jobs will decrease turnover among those lucky enough to find 
work. Implicit in Welch’s discussion  is the belief that jobs terminate at the 
initiative of  workers, and that employers would prefer lower turnover. 
This situation would represent a failure of  the market to achieve an 
efficient turnover rate where workers and employers have equalized their 
trade-offs between turnover and other aspects of  the employment bar- 
gain. Under the hypothesis of  an efficient trade-off, pursued here, it 
seems likely that turnover and unemployment are stimulated by a mini- 
mum wage. 
Another discussion of  the effect of the minimum wage on unemploy- 
ment appears in Mincer (1976). In his analysis, the job turnover rate is 
taken as constant, unaffected by the minimum wage. He does consider 
the influence of  unemployment on labor supply. 485  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
14.3  Turnover and Labor Costs 
All of the novelty in section 14.2 rests on the hypothesis that employers 
can operate at lower costs when turnover rates are higher, given a fixed 
hourly cash wage. To see this, consider the opposite case where turnover 
above a certain critical level is undesirable from the point of  view of the 
employer. Since turnover is assumed always to be undesirable to the 
worker, efficient arrangements will never involve a separation rate above 
the critical level. In this case, the efficient job-finding rate,f= O(s),  will 
rise rapidly as the separation rate approaches the critical level (say, s*), as 
shown in figure 14.6. 
The supply-and-demand diagram under  a wage fixed by  minimum 
wage legislation is shown in this case in figure 14.7. Here the net supply 
curve bends far to the left of  the gross supply curve because the job- 
finding rate drops rapidly as the separation rate approaches  s*. If market 
equilibrium occurs at a separation rate nears*, it will involve high rates of 
unemployment in the traditional sense of  a stagnant market: the unem- 
ployed will consist of  people who are having a great deal of  trouble 
separation 
I  rate 
I  I 
I  I 
1  I 
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finding jobs. The jobs they find eventually will last a reasonable length of 
time. This is the kind of  influence of the minimum wage depicted in the 
standard analysis. To the extent that the minimum wage raises the wage 
above its full market-clearing level, it creates a shortage of jobs, and jobs 
are rationed  among job-seekers by the increased difficulty in finding 
work. 
My point here is the theoretical and practical possibility that a mini- 
mum wage operates in the opposite way, to stimulate job turnover rather 
than to depress job-finding. The most convincing  part of the case favoring 
this hypothesis is the evidence presented earlier of  very high job separa- 
tion rates and rapid flows of workers into jobs in markets influenced by 
the minimum wage. This section gives some further reasons to think that 
the minimum wage exerts most of  its effect in raising job turnover. 
First, it may be useful to exhibit a class of  utility functions and cost 
functions where the efficient job-finding rate is literally constant, inde- 
pendent of  the minimum wage, and, indeed, independent of  the supply 
and demand for labor generally. Within this class, workers’ concerns 
about separation rates and job-finding operate through the unemploy- 
ment rate. In other words, a worker is indifferent between two labor 
markets where wages and unemployment  are the same, but one has 
higher separation and higher job-finding rates than the other. It is also 487  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
necessary to say something about workers’ willingness to trade off cash 
earnings against unemployment, which will depend on the level of public 
unemployment insurance and workers’ attitudes about the value of time 
spent out of work. A reasonable approximation is that there is a constant, 
A,  equal to zero for workers who  are indifferent between work  and 
unemployment (either because of  full unemployment insurance or high 
value of time in nonworking activities) and equal to one for workers for 
whom unemployment is a pure waste of time and who receive no unem- 
ployment insurance. Then a utility function capturing all of  this is 
W( 1 -  XU) 
or, in terms of  separation and job-finding rates, 
The indifference curve along which workers achieve a certain level of 
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f  w-y  s=- 
1-f y-(l-A) 
On the cost side, it seems reasonable to approximate total cost as the 
sum of (1) costs not related to the type of labor under consideration, say, 
A; (2) regular hourly employment costs, say, aw; (3) recruiting costs, 
proportional to the rate at which jobs are filled, s, the effort required to 
fill one job, p(n, and the hourly wage, w less (4)  the benefit, say, bws, of 
the flexibility associated with the separation rate, net of  training costs. 
The resulting cost function has the form 
C(W,  S, f)  = A + Bw[a + pcf)~  -  bs] 
It is only a useful approximation over the range of separation rates where 
it is plausible that rising rates convey benefits to the firm, on net. 
An efficient employment arrangement that yields a level of  statisfac- 
tion y to each worker can be described mathematically as the minimum of 
cost subject to the constraint that utility equal y: 
Min A + Bw[a + pcf)s -  bs] 
s, f 
f  w-Y  subject to s = - 
1-f  y-(l-A)w 
The minimum wage prevents achievement of  the fully efficient arrange- 
ment, where the minimum would be taken over the wage rate as well. 
Now the constraint can be substituted into the minimand to restate the 
problem as 
f  a -  [b -  pv")] -  f  1-f  y-(l-X)w 
But minimization of  this over the job-finding rate, f,  is equivalent to 
maximizing the expression 
f  [b -  Pml- 
1 -f 
The maximum occurs somewhere between f  = 0 and the critical job- 
finding rate, f  ,  where the recruiting costs, pcf), begin to outweigh the net 
benefits of  turnover, b  (figure 14.8). The important point is that the 
efficient job-finding rate is determined by the narrow consideration of 
balancing the employer's benefits from turnover against the worker's 
costs. Both are proportional to the hourly wage, so the  efficient job- 
finding rate is independent of  the level at which the government sets the 
minimum wage. It is also independent of the level of satisfaction achieved 
by workers and so independent of  the supply of  and demand for labor. 489  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
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It seems reasonable to expect that the efficient job-finding rate is fairly 
close to constant over a range of  market conditions, even if  the exact 
mathematical conditions set forth above do not hold. Obviously, the 
range includes only those separation rates where turnover has net ben- 
efits to employers. A sufficiently aggressive minimum wage will inevi- 
tably push the market close to the point where turnover becomes costly to 
employers, and the conventional analysis where the minimum creates a 
shortage of jobs will begin to apply. On the other hand, the effect of  a 
minimum wage that pushes the cash wage only moderately above its 
equilibrium may well be to stimulate turnover rather than to depress 
job-finding. 
The core of  the argument that turnover can benefit employers, as I 
have emphasized earlier, is the flexibility that brief job commitments 
provide to employers. At the most basic level, the minimum wage in- 
duces turnover by inhibiting employers from holding overhead labor. 
Instead of  paying a lower wage to long-term workers through thick or 
thin, employers subject to a minimum wage pay a high hourly wage to 
short-term workers who must finance themselves (at least partly) in times 
of slack. Only a tiny fraction of the fluctuations in demand that lie behind 
this process are aggregate-most  affect just the firm itself. They are not 
necessarily purely random, either. A high-turnover employment policy 490  Robert E. Hall 
makes it easier to accommodate seasonal swings in demand as well, for 
example. 
Other adaptations to the minimum wage are more subtle and probably 
take longer to respond to changes in the minimum. The scope for taking 
advantage of a high-wage, high-turnover employment policy depends on 
the technical organization of work within a firm. Training costs must be 
low in order to benefit from high turnover. Jobs must be highly standard- 
ized. The fast-food industry, which is a major source of  employment at 
the minimum wage, is the leading example of  this kind of  adaptation. 
Workers can be trained in a few hours. They need not even memorize the 
prices of items on the menu because each item has a separate button on 
the cash register. Job turnover is a way of  life in this industry, and the 
industry has learned to profit from it. Though obviously  many forces have 
contributed to the evolution of  the high-turnover practices of  the fast- 
food industry, my suggestion here is that the minimum wage is important 
among them. 
14.4  Achievement of the Efficient Job-finding and 
Separation Rates within the Labor Market 
The analysis in this chapter pictures employers and workers agreeing 
on three aspects of the employment arrangement: the cash hourly wage, 
the separation rate, and the job-finding rate. Only the first of  these is 
considered in the conventional analysis of  employment bargains. Is it 
meaningful to speak of  an agreement about separation or job-finding 
rates? 
Job separation is under the joint control of  the two parties to an 
employment arrangement. Separations can occur unilaterally as quitting 
or layoffs. Alternatively, they may occur by prearrangement, as when a 
summer or other temporary job comes to an end. Evidence from the 
United States suggests that the latter case is particularly important for 
teenagers (Hall 1978). In cases where there is no advance agreement 
about the duration of the job, there are generally understandings about 
how the job will come to an end. It is fairly easy for workers to find out the 
past layoff rates of  employers and reasonable to assume that these are 
guides to the future. Similarly, employers can inquire about the employ- 
ment histories of  potential workers to avoid those who have deviated 
from the norm for the market. Though neither party gives up the right to 
bring  about a separation unilaterally in  any one instance, both face 
penalties  for  systematic departures  from  the prevailing employment 
terms. 
Agreement about job-finding rates is a harder issue. A very general 
argument can be made that a market operating at an inefficient job- 
finding rate will be displaced by one operating at the efficient rate. In the 491  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
second market, everyone can be made better off than in the first. But this 
leaves the important question unanswered about how the market deter- 
mines its job-finding rate. This point is discussed in my earlier paper. A 
market operating away from the efficient job-finding rate presents arbi- 
trage opportunities for an intrepreneur willing to offer employment at 
alternative, efficient terms and to sell his workers’ services to employers. 
Temporary employment firms could have exactly this function in clerical 
and other markets, though, of course, there are many other reasons for 
their existence as well. Alternatively, a market with an inefficient, high 
job-finding rate offers arbitrage profits to an employer who makes special 
efforts to advertise that jobs are readily available, but on terms favorable 
to the employer.  As in  the case of  conventional supply-and-demand 
theory, the model presented here does not provide a fully worked-out 
story of  how the market moves toward its equilibrium, but restricts its 
attention to the equilibrium itself. 
While this discussion may lend some plausibility to the notion that the 
market does move eventually to the efficient equilibrium, it seems un- 
likely that the process is a speedy one. In particular, the prediction that 
the effect of  a higher minimum wage is to stimulate turnover rather than 
to make jobs harder to find is a prediction for the long run. In the short 
run, the minimum wage seems likely to push the market into disequilib- 
rium with an inefficiently low job-finding rate. The resulting lags are a 
potential  complication in  any empirical analysis of  the effect of  the 
minimum wage. 
14.5  Conclusion 
Jobs for young workers are readily available in the U.S. economy, in 
spite of  minimum wage legislation that affects youths much more than 
any other segment of the labor force. Young workers find jobs just as fast 
as their older counterparts. The conventional analysis of  the potential 
effects of a minimum wage suggests that it creates a shortage of jobs and 
so should make it more difficult for any one worker to find a job. Taken 
together, these constitute an apparent case against any important effect 
of the minimum wage. It seems that high unemployment rates of youths 
have to be blamed on something else. 
This chapter has shown that a minimum wage can bring about high 
unemployment without causing a shortage of jobs or reducing the job- 
finding rate. Rather, in the long run, an effective minimum wage can 
induce the evolution of  employment practices and arrangements that 
raise turnover.  The minimum wage does not block the market from 
achieving an efficient degree of  tightness, that is, an efficienctly high 
job-finding rate. In fact, under reasonable assumptions about turnover 
and recruiting costs, the efficient job-finding rate is a constant, unaffected 492  Robert E. Hall 
by the minimum wage or  the supply of and demand for labor. The adverse 
effects of the minimum wage are then concentrated in inefficiently high 
separation rates. The shockingly low average duration of  jobs held by 
teenagereless than three months-may  be an important consequence 
of  the minimum wage. If  so, high unemployment among youths can be 
traced in part to the minimum wage, which makes them become unem- 
ployed too often even though it does not inhibit job-finding once they are 
unemployed. 
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Comment  Christopher A. Sims 
This chapter brings to bear  on the youth  unemployment problem  a 
modern, abstractly interesting, theoretical apparatus. The operational 
implications of the analysis have not been pushed very far. The main one 
appears to be a refutation of the claim that, because job-finding rates for 
teenagers are not low relative to adult rates, the minimum wage must not 
be an important explanation for high youth unemployment rates. Hall is 
surely right that some of  the impact of  the minimum wage should be 
expected to show up in separation rates, as firms adapt and new firms 
enter exploiting the potential productivity gains from high unemploy- 
ment (hence high employee-finding rates) and high separation rates. 
Minnesota. 
Christopher A.  Sims is associated  with the Department of  Economics at the University  of 493  The Minimum Wage and Job Turnover 
As the chapter makes clear, the relative importance of  effects of  the 
minimum on job-finding and on separation rates depends on the shapes 
of  indifference curves and iso-cost functions about which there is essen- 
tially no information. If  one presumed that in the absence of a minimum 
teenagers would have job-finding rates similar to adults and also that the 
minimum wage is a major explanatory factor for youth unemployment, 
then the facts that youth unemployment rates are high and job-finding 
rates for youths are not very different from adult rates would justify a 
conclusion that the minimum affects unemployment rates mainly through 
separation rates.  Of  course, in fact, it  is quite plausible that  youth 
job-finding rates would be much higher than adult job-finding rates in the 
absence of  a minimum wage, so the question must remain open. 
But the importance of  this chapter lies less in its direct implications 
than in the promise of its style of  analysis. The paper invokes the notion 
that labor market transactions involve implicit commitments about job 
duration on the part of both employers and employees. Hall follows most 
of  the literature in this area in proceeding as if such implicit contracts 
work efficiently, but I think that in doing so he misses the main potential 
contribution of this kind of analysis to explaining the special character of 
youth job markets. 
The labor market as a whole is rife with familiar externalities, most of 
which are regularly ignored in sophisticated theoretical work on equilib- 
rium under uncertainty.  Ignoring them may  be justified for practical 
purposes  as a first approximation, especially in developing aggregate 
conclusions. But some of  the most important distinguishing features of 
the youth labor market are precisely that many of  these externalities 
occur in magnified form there.  Explicit long-term labor contracts are 
difficult to enforce legally, and raise moral hazard problems as well. 
Implicit contract  theorists rely,  as does Hall here, on the notion  of 
“reputation” to enforce adherence to implicit contracts about duration. 
But youths who are taking their first few jobs have no reputation to guide 
their potential employers; furthermore, individual separations have very 
large impacts on their work histories. An employer who hires an inexperi- 
enced teenager and keeps him on twice the usual job tenure because he is 
reliable (or fires him quickly because he is unreliable) is performing a 
screening service for other employers for which he is not compensated. 
Job-finding rates matter to  workers, and hiring rates matter to employers, 
but a worker’s own employer’s hiring rate (unlike the employer’s separa- 
tion rate) does not matter much to a worker.  For older workers this 
externality is circumvented to some extent by seniority systems  for layoffs 
and rehiring and by “internal labor markets.” But these mechanisms are 
obviously much less important for youth labor markets. 
An implicit contract theory framework which took account of  these 
sources of externalities could be a valuable guide to empirical work with 494  Robert E. Hall 
policy implications. As it is, casual meditation on the list of externalities 
in the preceding paragraph suggests the plausibility of  a picture of  the 
youth labor market very different from that Hall presents. One would 
think that in an unregulated market youths would place a socially in- 
efficient premium on job stability (for fear that short tenure jobs, regard- 
less of  the reason for termination, would make their work history look 
unusually unstable).  In  addition, firms, having no way  to get credit 
through the market for the contribution their hiring rates make to the 
job-finding rate, might put an inefficient premium on stability. A moder- 
ate minimum wage, by pushing the market in the direction of  greater 
average turnover rates, may then make typical youths better off. Of 
course,  as Summers and Clark emphasize in this volume (chapter 7), 
youths have diverse labor market experiences, and those who have low 
productivity may be made worse off by the minimum; this negative effect 
could operate mainly by decreasing the job-finding rate of the less pro- 
ductive group while preserving a high job-finding rate for the more 
productive majority and leaving an aggregate picture of a high job-finding 
rate. 
This picture of  the youth labor market and the minimum wage is put 
forth  not  as a firm conclusion, but  as an indication of  the range  of 
reasonable views which remain  consistent with  a modern theoretical 
approach to the subject. Until more detailed theory is  developed in 
tighter connection to empirical facts, Hall’s picture of  a youth labor 
market  characterized  by  inefficiently high  unemployment  due to in- 
efficiently high separation rates due in turn to the minimum wage remains 
in the category of  stimulating speculation. 
Comment  Martin Neil Baily 
Robert Hall has written an informative and elegant paper. Good theory is 
often uncomplicated; it focuses on the key relationships. The story comes 
through without a mess of algebra. Hall is following Mincer and others in 
incorporating turnover as an integral part of the analysis. This is the right 
way to go. 
Trying to understand the nature of unemployment is like trying to put 
handcuffs on an octopus.  You think you have it tied down and then 
another pair of tentacles get you round the throat. Hall presents a specific 
picture of teenage unemployment and it may very well be the correct one, 
but it is not the only one. Hall asserts that teenagers can find jobs easily, 
but that the minimum wage results in very short job tenure and excessive 
unemployment. 
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There are, however, alternative scenarios consistent with observation. 
First, if the jobs open to teenagers do not match their job aspirations they 
may drift from job to job and in and out of  the labor force of their own 
volition. Reducing the minimum wage would only reduce unemployment 
if it encouraged more low-wage but nevertheless attractive positions (like 
apprenticeships). It could have no impact at all. 
Second, are jobs really easy to find? The evidence given for this view is 
that the average duration of unemployment spells is short and that the 
job-finding rate is similar for young persons and adults. The trouble is 
that words like “hard”  and “easy”  are not well defined. Consider a 
professional in his or her late thirties looking for a job. The job will be a 
major source of satisfaction or frustration and will probably be held for 
several years or perhaps for the remainder of  the working life. Three 
months, six months, even longer is an appropriate time to spend search- 
ing or waiting for the right job to open up. On the other hand, consider 
the position of teenagers. Males 16 to 19 in 1974 spent nearly five months 
unemployed on average and then spent less than three months employed 
(see Clark  and Summers, “Labor Market Dynamics and Unemploy- 
ment,” tables 4  and 8). Such a long wait for such a short job cannot 
possibly reflect productive search. Relative to the length of time they are 
held, jobs for teenagers appear hard to find. This point is important if one 
is predicting how a properly functioning youth labor market would work. 
It could be that young people want jobs that last only for short periods, 
either because of schooling or simply to sample several possible careers 
before settling down. If  so, then an optimal pattern of  unemployment 
would show teens with shorter spells of  employment and very much 
shorter spells of  unemployment than adults. 
Third, since the incidence of  unemployment is  very unevenly dis- 
tributed, the average rate of job finding or  length of unemployment spell 
may not be relevant. Most of  the unemployment problem and indeed 
most of  the impact of  the minimum wage may come from the minority of 
teenagers that have very great difficulty finding jobs. 
However, while  Hall’s scenario is not  obviously correct,  it  is not 
obviously incorrect either, so let me take it as given and consider his 
model on its own terms. The central variables in the analysis are the 
job-finding ratefand the separation rate s. The discussion of the separa- 
tion rate was a little confusing because it failed to distinguish between 
separations initiated or desired by a firm and those initiated by a worker. 
With due allowance for recruiting and training costs, firms will welcome 
quittings and initiate layoffs when the wage exceeds the value of  the 
marginal product. The freedom to make layoffs is valued by firms. But 
during periods of  high product demand, separations are unwelcome and 
firms will discourage them. Although the available data on quittings and 
layoffs do not provide perfect proxies for the two cases, the way these 496  Robert E. Hall 
series move against each other over the cycle does suggest the importance 
of  the distinction. I would have preferred “layoff rate” to “separation 
rate” as a description of  the key parameter s in the model. 
My  second misgiving concerns the ability of  an unregulated  labor 
market for teenagers to achieve the efficient solution described by Hall. 
In my  own work on contract theory and temporary layoff  models I 
assumed that everyone knew the true probability distributions. Firms 
with very variable employment patterns would have to compensate their 
workers fully for the resulting high probability of layoff. This assumption 
was  made  apologetically,  but  nowadays  rational  expectations  are 
assumed routinely. I would echo Christopher Sim’s view that in the case 
of  teenagers the assumption is a very strong one. In 1978,42% of those 
unemployed aged 16 to 19 had never worked before. It is hard to believe 
they knew the layoff probabilities for all their prospective jobs. 
Is it necessary to use an implicit contract-type model to reconcile a 
minimum wage analysis  with high turnover? Not really. All that is needed 
is a formulation incorporating frequent fluctuations in product demand. 
Suppose  is a shift parameter for the ith firm in period t. The shifts could 
come either in the product price for a competitive firm or in the position 
of  the demand curve for a monopolistic firm. The value of  the marginal 
product is then Vi  (Lit,  EJ  where Lit  is employment. Firms equate Vj  to 
the minimum wage  T$‘,  giving labor demand Lit = Di (m, at any 
instant. In a labor market made up of firms like firm i, aggregate employ- 
ment will decrease with increases in the minimum wage and jobs are 
generally rationed. But there is quite possibly a great deal of turnover 
with vacancies opening up frequently and layoffs occurring frequently. It 
simply depends on the distributions of  the E~. 
Let me now finish with a few comments on the teenage unemployment 
problem  (these  comments  are  not  addressed  specifically to  Hall’s 
chapter). 
1. I wonder about the magnitude of the impact of the minimum wage. 
When aggregate unemployment raises, the rate of wage inflation dimin- 
ishes little and slowly. When the supply of teenage labor increases, would 
we expect the teenage relative wage to move quickly to a new equilib- 
rium. Even in an unregulated market I would expect to see persistent 
high  levels of  unemployment  as a result  of  the baby boom  and the 
increase in labor-force participation. 
Richard Freeman has been studying union wage behavior recently and 
he has observed that entry level wages are raised relative to the wages of 
senior  workers.  The legal minimum wage  of  $3.35 per  hour  hardly 
matters when the union entry wage is $5.00 per hour. Of course, union- 
ized workers are in the minority, but unions are very influential in many 
of  the industries and occupations that would be the best bet for young 
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Few if  any of the existing studies of  the impact of  the minimum wage 
test alternative explanations of the persistent high level of  teenage unem- 
ployment. If  the minimum wage is the only possible explanation, presum- 
ably there is no need for econometrics. A high union entry wage gives an 
alternative. A model incorporating slow relative wage adjustment follow- 
ing shifts in supply or demand would be another. 
2.  Our inability to agree on the nature of youth unemployment suggest 
that there is no simple, single scenario that does justice to reality. Some 
teenagers are prevented from getting jobs by the minimum wage, some 
are prevented by other sources of wage stickiness and some could get jobs 
but aspire to become highly paid basketball players and will not accept 
them. Teenage unemployment probably has both voluntary and involun- 
tary aspects to it. 
3.  It is legitimate to view joblessness among students somewhat dif- 
ferently from other unemployment. But simply to add employed youths 
to in-school youths to  give a figure for those “productivly occupied” gives 
too rosy a picture.  There is a crisis in our schools comparable to the 
problems in the labor market. Absenteeism and absence of real learning 
are common. There is a social problem afflicting a significant minority of 
our young people  encompassing joblessness,  crime,  unwanted  preg- 
nancy, partial illiteracy, and lack of  technical skills. 
4. Migration has been a major factor in the labor market difficulties of 
young people, especially of  blacks. In the early 1950s a much larger 
fraction of  young blacks lived in rural areas than today. The decline of 
employment in agriculture has thrown a heavy burden of  adjustment onto 
the low-skill urban labor market. New waves of low-skill immigrants and 
their children are perpetuating the problem. 
5. The degree of  inequality of  opportunity between a suburban mid- 
dle-class teenager and a lower-class  ghetto youth is deeply disturbing. We 
must try to clarify the causes of  the problem and do something about 
them, for we should not let the situation persist for generation  after 
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